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Wage and P r i c e C0ntr0ls-GOVERNMENT CONPROCUREMENT
ACTTO
TRACTS-EXECUTIVE
USE OF THE FEDERAL
DISBARPRIVATE
FIRMSFROM GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS
IF WAGE
AND PRICESTANDARDS
ARE NOT FOLLOWED-AFL-CIOv. Kahn,
618 F.2d 784 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
On November 1, 1978, President Carter issued Executive
Order 12,092 (E.O. 12,092)' instructing the Council on Wage and
to establish noninflationary wage and
Price Stability (Co~ncil)~
price standards for the entire e~onomy.~
For workers, the order
provides that wage increases can be no more than seven percent
annually;' for a business, price increases must be at least 0.5 percent less than the company's recent average price in~reases.~
The President also ordered the chairman of the Council to monitor compliance with the standards and to publish the names of
noncompliant busine~ses.~
The Executive order requires all federal contractors to cer1. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 8 401 note (Supp. I11 1979).
2. Congress created the Council on Wage and Price Stability in 1974. Council on
Wage and Price Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 93-387, 88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,
1977, 1979), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979). The Council's major
role under the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act is to monitor the private sector
of the economy for inflationary wage and price developments as well as the inflationary
impact of the programs and activities of the Federal Government. Id. 8 3(a).
3. The Council was to refine the standards to fit various sectors of the economy. 3
C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 8 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). The Council first
published a series of proposed wage and price standards on November 7, 1978. 43 Fed.
Reg. 51,938 (1978). After public comments and clarification, the final wage and price
standards were issued by the Council on December 28, 1978. 43 Fed. Reg. 60,772 (1978).
Later modifications and additions to the wage and price standards were issued on January 25, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg. 5336 (1979); February 13, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 9582 (1979);
March 23, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,910 (1979); and April 20, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,776
(1979) (current versions at 6 C.F.R. §§ 705-705.78 (1980)).
4. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. I11 1979).
5. Id. The requirement seeks to ensure that a company will not be able to increase
prices faster than its past average of price increases. Some of the exceptions to the general standards program include an optional modified price standard for the wholesale
and retail trade industry and the food manufacturing and processing industries, 6 C.F.R.
$5 705.42-.43 (1980), and a profit margin limitation standard for companies that have
uncontrollable costs or that cannot calculate their average price change, id. 5 705.6.
6. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. I11 1979). The President also ordered the Council to publish procedures to be used in Council proceedings
relating to the standards, and to "take such other action as may be necessary and consistent with the purposes of [section 1-101 of the order]". Id.
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tify their compliance with the wage and price standards7 and directs the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) to implement sanctions against contractors who fail to comply.' On
January 4, 1979, OFPP promulgated a policy statement, effective February 15, 1979, providing that noncompliant contractors
and first-tier subcontractors whose contracts exceed five million
dollarsa may be subject to contract termination, equitable reduction of the contract price, and ineligibility for future government
contracts. lo
On March 31,1979, the AFL-CIO challenged E.O. 12,092 in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia as an unlawful interference with the right to bargain collectively and as an
Executive usurpation of congressional powers. The district court
granted the labor organization's motion for summary judgment
on the latter ground and enjoined the enforcement of the procurement compliance program." That injunction was stayed
pending the outcome of the expedited appeal to the US. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The court of appeals,
sitting en bane, reversed the order of the district court, vacated
its injunction, and held that section 205(a) of the 1949 Federal
Procurement Act (FPASA)12 granted authority to the President
to issue E.O. 12,092.lS
7. The Executive order directs the head of each executive agency and military department to require all federal contractors to certify that they are in compliance with the
wage and price standards. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp.
I11 1979). An Office of Federal Procurement Policy letter also requires contracts exceeding $5 million to state that the contractor intends to comply with the standards. 44 Fed.
Reg. 1229-30 (1979).
8. 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. 5 401 note (Supp. I11 1979).
9. 44 Fed. Reg. 1229 (1979). The statement also stated that as the OFPP gained
experience with the compliance program, contracts worth less than five million dollars
might be included. Id. The present compliance program should cover 65-70 percent of all
Federal Government contracts, approximately $50 billion. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d
784, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
10. 44 Fed. Reg. 1229, 1230 (1979). A contract termination or finding of ineligibility
for future government contracts and subcontracts can be waived if: (1)the agency's need
for the product or service is essential to national security or public safety; (2) such an
action would cause severe financial hardship and threaten the contractor's or subcontractor's ability to survive; or (3) the contractor or subcontractor comes into compliance and
agreea to an equitable reduction of the contract price. Id. at 1231.
11. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 90, 102 (D.D.C.), vacated, 618 F.2d 784
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
12. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 5 205(a), 40 U.S.C. 8
486(a) (1976).
13. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915
(1979).
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An Executive order is a Presidential command that the
Government or citizens act in a specified manner. The order has
no legal effect unless authorized by some constitutional or statutory provision.14 Most Executive orders are founded upon specific congressional auth~rization,'~although the courts in rare
circumstances have found them to be authorized by the Constitution? The courts in recent years have found broad authority
in FPASA17 for the President to issue diverse Executive orders,
including use of the Act to uphold antidiscrimination orders?

A. History of FPASA
1. Legislative Enactment of FPASA

In 1949 Congress enacted FPASA1@to centralize federal
government procurement and property management functions.
The House floor manager and sponsor of the bill, Representative
Holifield, explained the purpose of FPASA as follows:
This bill [FPASA] establishes a basis for a plan to simplify
the procurement, utilization, and disposal of Government
property, and to reorganize certain agencies of the Government, and for other purposes.
The major purpose of this bill is to provide for a uniform
system of property management and supply for the entire Federal G o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~

Section 205(a) of FPASA authorizes the Preadent to "effectuate the provisions of said Act" in a manner "not inconsistent
with" the Act?' Representative Holifield also commented on the
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
15. Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 273 n.5 (1974); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956); United States v. Kelly, 342 U.S.
193 (1952). On occasion, subsequent legislation has ratified an earlier order. Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943);
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
16. See, eg., Jenkins v. Collard, 145 US. 546 (1892); Lapeyre v. United States, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.)191 (1873).
17. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,40 U.S.C. 55 471-514
(1976).
18. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text infra.
19. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, ch. 288, 63 Stat. 377
(current version at 40 U.S.C. 55 471-514 (1976)).
20. 95 CONC.REC.7441 (1949).
21. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 5 205(a), 40 U.S.C. 5
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scope of section 205(a):
Continuing in this vein we see that property management affects every executive agency and so the bill expressly authorizes the President, himself, to prescribe policies and directives, and specifies that these Presidential policies and
directives shall govern-not merely guide-not only the Administrator but all executive agencies in carrying out these
property-management function^?^

Nevertheless, there are specific limitations on the President's authority: the President may not affect existing "stabilization" programs. Section 502(d) of FPASA provides:
Nothing in this Act shall impair or affectany authority of . . .
( 2 ) any executive agency with respect to any phase (including,
but not limited to, procurement . . .) of any program conducted for purposes of resale, price support, grants to farmers,
stabilization, transfer to foreign governments, or foreign aid,
relief, or rehabilitation . . . .ss

2. Executive Antidiscrimination Orders and FPASA

In recent cases the courts have found authority in FPASA
for Executive antidiscrimination orders. The FPASA contains
the goals of "economy" and "efficiency" in federal government
procurement? and some courts have stated that the Executive
antidiscrimination orders are valid because they promote "economy" and "efficiency." The first two courts to suggest this proposition did so by way of dictqg5a court in a subsequent case
486(a) (1976).
22. 95 CONG.REC. 7441 (1949) (emphasis added).
23. Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 502(d), 40 U.S.C.
474 (1976) (emphasis added).
24. Id. § 201(a), 40 U.S.C. 481(a) (1976).
25. In Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964), the court did not
reach the issue but commented that the
Defendant does not contend that the requiring of non-discrimination provisions in government contracts is beyond the power of Congress. . . . In view of
the above quoted subsections of 205 [of FPASA] and the declaration of policy by Congress in § 2 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, and its amendments, SO U.S.C.A. App. $ 2062, we have no doubt that the applicable executive orders and regulations have the force of law.
Id. at 8.
In Farkas v. Texas Instrument Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
977 (1967), the court noted in dictum,
We would be hesitant to say that the antidiscrimination provisions of Executive Order No. 10,925 are so unrelated to the establishment of "an economical
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held so directlyeM
The first case to directly face the issue of whether FPASA
could support an Executive antidiscrimination order was Contractors Association v. Secretary of Labor.27 In this case the
Third Circuit affirmed the validity of the aftirmative action
"Philadelphia Plan" issued pursuant to Executive Order 11,246
(E.O. 11,246):8 stating that the antidiscrimination provisions
"would seem to be authorized by the broad grant of procurement [FPASA] authority?@ The court explained that there was
a connection between the Executive order and the FPASA goals
of economy and efficiency because it "is in the interest of the
United States . to see that its suppliers are not over the long
run increasing its costs and delaying its programs by excluding
from the labor pool available minority workmen."80
In United States v. New Orleans Public Service Inc.,.l the
Fifth Circuit commented that the same antidiscrimination order
that was involved in Contractors Associations2 was valid on the
basis of FPASA even though a utility company questioned Presidential authority to condition federal contracts upon compliance with equal employment requirements.'. The court also
noted that the order was valid because it was congruent with the
congressional intent embodied in both title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act

..

and efficient system for . . . the procurement and supply" of property and services, 40 U.S.C.A. 5 471 [FPASA], that the order should be treated as issued
without statutory authority. Indeed, appellees make no such challenge to its
validity.
Id. a t 632 n.1. Both Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1045 n.18 (7th
Cir. 1975) and Northeast Constr. Co. v. Rommey, 485 F.2d 752, 760-61 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
suggest broad authority to achieve social and economic goals through federal procurement controls. Northeast indicates that if executive or congressional programs promote
Federal procurement considerations of economy, then FPASA can uphold the programs.
485 F.2d a t 760-61. For a discussion of the limitations of Rossetti and Northeast, see
AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 95-6 & n.15 (D.D.C.), vacated, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
26. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971).
27. Id.
28. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation) as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,375,3
C.F.R. 684 (1969), superceded in part by Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1969),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. (1976).
29. 442 F.2d a t 170.
30. Id.
31. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
32. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
33. 553 F.2d a t 465-67.
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of 1972?'
Nevertheless, in United States u. East Texas Motor Freight
System, I ~ C the
. , ~Fifth
~ Circuit limited the scope of the antidiscrimination orders. The court held that the antidiscrimination
order, E.O. 11,246, could not invalidate a seniority system that
was lawful under title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The court observed that title VII's exemption for bona fide seniority systems
was a statement of congressional intent, and that "[tlhe Executive may not, in defiance of such policy, make unlawful-or penalize-a bona fide seniority system.w~
These court rulings suggest that FPASA has been used to
uphold the validity of Executive antidiscrimination orders; however, East Texas limits the application of an Executive order to
the extent it is found that Congress has expressed a contrary
intent regarding the specific subject matter." With this principle
in mind, it is necessary to examine congressional actions in the
area of wage and price regulations.

B. History of Wage and Price Regulation
Congress has at various times authorized the President to
enforce wage and price controls. In each case the authority to
control wages and prices with economic sanctions was carefully
monitored by Congress. Congress enacted the Emergency Price
Control Act of 194Zm .to regulate prices for government contracts;ss the Stabilization Act of 1942, which amended the Emer34. Id. at 467.
35. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
36. Id. at 185.
37. Justice Jackson discussed the validity of Presidential actions and Executive orders in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), by noting, "[wlhen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb." Id. at 637. The
Youngstown analysis of the President's authority, as explained in United States v. New
Orleans Public Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436
US. 942 (1978), implies that an Executive order program would not be valid if there was
a congressional statute which was inconsistent with the Executive order. See id. at 467
n.8. See also AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 810-11 (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 443 US.916 (1979); Adequacy of the Adrninistmtion's Anti-Inflation Program (Part 1): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 494 (1979) (Congressional Research, American
Law Division, opinion on constitutionality of E.O. 12,092) [hereinafter cited as 1979
Hearings].
38. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired).
39. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 490.
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gency Price Control Act:O was enacted to limit wages and agricultural prices." In each of these Acts, Congress carefully
defined the power being granted the President and set specific
expiration dates? In title IV of the Defense Production Act of
1950:' Congress again granted the President authority to control wages and prices. This Act contained clear guidelines circumscribing the President's authority. Congress later terminated
the President's wage and price authority by amending the original act.& Later Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act
of 1970:' authorizing the President to issue orders and regulations deemed appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and
salaries. Congress allowed the President's authority to expire on
April 30, 1974?
Between 1973 and the expiration of the wage and price control authority granted under the Economic Stabilization Act,
nineteen bills concerning wage and price regulation were introduced in Congress." The bills were designed to continue the Executive's broad control over the economy, or more specifically, to
extend the authorization of the Economic Stabilization Act.48 Of
these bills, not one was voted out of the Senate committee^.^^
In addition to these nineteen bills, Senator Muskie proposed a wage and price control amendment to an unrelated bill.
The amendment would have empowered the Cost of Living
Council to enforce decontrol agreements and given the President
stand-by authority to reimpose controls. The Senate defeated
the amendment by a vote of 56 to 32?O
40.
41.
42.
43.

Ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired).
1979 Hearings, supra note 37, a t 491.
Id. at 491 & n.99.
Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (expired).
44. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 530,66 Stat. 296; 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 491.
45. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired). The Act was later altered by the
Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210,85 Stat. 743 (1971)
(expired).
46. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 491-93. Congress tightly controlled the time
periods allowed the President to use his authority despite a Presidential request that his
authority continue for a longer period of time. Id. at 492.
47. Id. at 494. A list of the bills (with synopses) can be found in OFFICEOF ECONOMIC
TREASURY, HISTORICAL
WORKING
PAPERSON THE ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION,
DEP'T OF
PROGRAM,
AUG.15,1971 TO APB. 30,1974, PARTI, at 221-23 (1974) [hereinST~ILIZATION
WORKING
PAPERS];
1979 Hearings, supra note 37, a t 494 n.106.
after cited as HISTORICAL
48. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 494.
49. Id. at 495.
50. Id.
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Besides the proposed amendment and bills seeking to extend broad control of the economy, other bills concerning wage
and price regulation were introduced in Congress in 1973 and
1974. These bills included proposals to maintain controls on specific sectors of the economy, to terminate the Economic Stabilization Act before its scheduled expiration date, and to provide
alternative transition measures as the existing controls were
phased out. None of these bills passed."
In August 1974, after rejecting all of these proposals for Executive economic control, Congress enacted the Council on Wage
and Price Stability Act (COWPSA)" which provided for an advisory body to monitor wage and price activity. COWPSA contained no provision for economic sanctions; in fact, the act specifically prohibited mandatory wage and price control^.^ In 1979
Congress extended COWPSA "without significant [substantive]
modification,"" although the budget and staff allowance was
increased.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia confronted the first impression questionMof whether an
Executive orderderiving its authority from FPASA-could require contractors to adhere to Presidential wage and price standards as a condition of doing business with the federal government." Admitting that there was a "difficult problem of
the majority stated that any Executive
statutory constr~ction,"~~
51. Id. at 494 n.106. A list of the bills (with synopses) is found in HISTORICAL
WORKPAPERS,supra note 47, at 223-40.
52. Pub. L. No. 93-387,88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,1977,1979), reprinted in
12 U.S.C. 5 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979).
53. Id. § 3(b).
54. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 US. 915
(1979). See also H.R. REP. NO. 33, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, 12-13 (1979).
55. Responding to the AFL-CIO challenge, government counsel admitted that this
was the "first direct attempt . . . found [where the Executive used] the procurement
power and . . . another executive agency to set wage and price guidelines through executive orders." Transcript of Hearing on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, May 16,
1979, at 30, quoted in AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 92-93, vacated, 618 F.2d 784
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 US. 915 (1979); see 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, a t 72
(prepared statement of Milton J. Socolar).
56. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 787,792 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 US. 915
(1979).
57. Id. at 787.
ING

43 11

CASENOTES

439

order based on section 205(a) of FPASAs8 must be consistent
with the criteria of economy and efficiency.'@ The majority held
that "[b]ecause there is a sutticiently close nexus between those
criteria and the procurement compliance program established by
Executive Order 12092," the program is authorized by FPASA."
The majority found support for its holding in cases involving analogous antidiscrimination orders that also derived their
authority from FPASA." The majority concluded that courts
which had dealt with equal employment Executive orders had
found a close relationship between FPASA criteria of economy
and efficiency and the objective of ending employment discrimination. According to this reasoning, if wage and price standards
encourage economy and efficiency, they would be valid under
FPASA." Two brief concurring opinions and two longer dissenting opinions accompanied the majority opinion.6s

The correctness of the majority's holding that E.O. 12,092 is
a proper exercise of Presidential authority depends upon the directive's conformity to "congressional intent" in the area of wage
and price regulation? Some courts upholding the antidis58. 40 U.S.C. 5 486(a) (1976).
59. 618 F.2d a t 792.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 790-92.
62. Id. at 792. The majority decided that the Council on Wage and Price Stability
Act does not bar E.O. 12,092. Id. at 794-96. Also, the majority summarily dismissed the
contention that E.O. 12,092 contravenes the congressional policy of free collective bargaining. Id. at 796.
63. Two brief concurring opinions stressed the "close nexus" between E.O. 12,092
and the goal of FPASA to achieve economy and efficiency. Id. a t 796-97 (Bazelon, J., and
Tamm, J., concurring). The first dissenting opinion strongly contended that the majority
position was: (1) unrelated to the congressional purpose of FPASA and other wage and
price measures, id. at 799-800, 808-09 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting); (2) inconsistent with
explicit provisions of the 1949 Act, id. at 800-03; (3) unlikely to provide economy to the
government, id. at 803-08; and (4) unresponsive to the constitutional barrier to excessive
delegation to the President, id. at 811-14. The second dissenting opinion found that E.O.
12,092 was impermissibly mandatory, outside the scope of the FPASA, unsupported by
the antidiscrimination Executive orders, and banned by COWPSA. Id. at 816-19 (Robb,
J., dissenting.)
64. The President must conform to congressional intent since the power to control
wages and prices is a congressional power. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); F.P.C. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575, 582 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941); United States v.
Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533,571 (1939); 1979Hearings, supra note 37, at
476 (Congressional Research, American Law Division opinion).
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crimination orders found that the congressional intent behind
FPASA may be satisfied upon a finding that the order promotes
If the courts
economy and efficiency in federal proc~rement.~~
uphold Executive orders that are as tenuously linked to FPASA
goals of economy and efficiency as the antidiscrimination orders,
then the wage-price order must also be valid under FPASA:'j
However, the facts in the instant case can be distinguished
in three respects from those in the antidiscrimination cases relied upon by the majority: (1) the inconsistency with section
502(d) of FPASA, (2) the applicability of the East Texas exception, and (3) the inadequacy of congressional ratification.

A. Inconsistency with Section 502(d)
Even if E.O.12,092 might promote some economy and efficiency, FPASA cannot be used to uphold it if the order violates
provisions of FPASA itself. Section 205(a) of FPASA states that
"[tlhe President may prescribe such policies and directives, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as he shall deem
necessary to effectuate the provisions of said
E.O. 12,092 appears inconsistent with section 502(d) of
FPASA because it will alter a wage and price "stabilization"
program. Section 502(d) provides:

..

Nothing in this Act shall impair or affect any authority o f .
(2) any executive agency with respect to any phase (including,
but not limited to, procurement . .) of any program conducted for purposes of resale, price support, grants to farmers,
stabilization, transfer to foreign governments, or foreign aid,
relief, or rehabilitation . . 08

.

..

Three points support the conclusion that E.O.12,092 is inconsistent with section 502(d): (1) the word "stabilization" in section
502(d) refers to wage and price programs, (2) the words "impair
or affect" in section 502(d) prohibit alteration of a "stabilization" program, and (3) E.O. 12,092 does alter a current stabilizaThe majority appears to agree that regulating wages and prices is a congressional
power, as did the appellants. 618 F.2d at 787. The first dissent also agreed with this
point. Id. at 798 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
65. See notes 24-34 and accompanying text supra.
66. 618 F.2d at 792. Reliance upon FPASA to uphold the antidiscrimination orders
has often been criticized as construing the Act too broadly. See, e-g., J. Remmert, E.O.
11,246: Executive Encroachment, 55 A.B.A. J. 1037 (1969).
67. 40 U.S.C. 3 &(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
68. Id. 3 474 (1976) (emphasis added).
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tion program-COWPSA.
First, the word "stabilization" in section 502(d) refers to
wage and price regulation. The majority suggests that the word
stabilization refers only to "farm commodity support programs
. . without any direct relevance for procurement policy generally."6@However, section 502(d) clearly indicates that FPASA
cannot impair or affect "stabili~ation."~~
The words "price support" and "grants to farmers" are set apart from stabilization,
implying that stabilization refers to a different program." The
majority and dissent leave the meaning of stabilization unsettled, although the dissent points out that the word stabilization
refers to price controls in the 1942 Price Control Act.72
Furthermore, evidence suggests that Congress used the
word stabilization to refer to wage and price controls. In 1942
Congress passed the Stabilization Act which specifically empowered the President to control workers' wages as well as agricultural prices.?' Since the 1949 FPASA was enacted shortly after
the expiration of this Act it can be inferred that Congress used
the same word to refer to wage and price standards. Congress
has used the term "stabilization" or "stability" to refer directly
to other wage and price control programs, such as the 1950 Defense Act title on Price and Wage Stabilization," the 1970 Economic Stabilization Act," and the 1974 Council on Wage and
Price Stability Act.'.
Second, the meaning of "impair or affect" in section 502(d)
of FPASAT7is most reasonably interpreted to prohibit any action under FPASA which significantly alters a stabilization
agency or program, whether by obstructing it or by greatly expanding its power. The majority states that even if the word stabilization refers to wage and price controls, section 502(d) only
indicates that the President shall not "obstruct" a "stabilization

.

69. 618 F.2d at 789 11-24.
70. 40 U.S.C. $ 474 (1976).
71. 618 F.2d at 801 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. The Stabilization Act of 1942, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired), was effective during much of the 1940's.
74. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798, 803 (1950) (expired).
75. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84,Stat. 799 (1970) (expired).
76. Pub. L. No. 93-387,88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,1977,1979), reprinted in
12 U.S.C. $ 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979).
77. 40 U.S.C. $ 474 (1976).
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program."78 Nevertheless, the clear wording of section 502(d)
says that any action taken under FPASA shall not impair or affect, not merely avoid obstruction. It seems much more reasonable to conclude that the words "or affect" mean any significant
alteration of a stabilization program, whether by obstructing it
or by expanding its powers:9 particularly in the context of the
instant case in which the President attempted to expand Executive authority.
Finally, E.O. 12,092 significantly alters an existing stabilization program, the Council on Wage and Price Stability Act
(COWPSA).80Permitting the President to disqualify contractors
who do not comply with wage and price standards from federal
contracts substantially affects the voluntary nature of
COWPSA's guidelines by providing its administrators with leverage they would not otherwise have-the power to set wages
and prices and have them enforced by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy. COWPSA simply created a program and authorized administrators to monitor the economy and set voluntary guidelines without the use of economic sanctions. E.O.
12,092, however, alters the impact of COWPSA's recommended
guidelines by providing procurement sanctions against firms
that do not comply. Therefore, the Executive order greatly affects the previously voluntary COWPSA guidelines.
The majority in the instant case failed to distinguish between E.O. 12,092, which violates section 502(d), and the antidiscrimination orders, which do not. The antidiscrimination orders do not represent a stabilization program, nor any of the
other programs that a President may not "impair or affect"
under section 502(d) of FPASA. Thus, even though E.O. 12,092
may promote the same policy of economy and efficiency as the
antidiscrimination orders, E.O. 12,092 cannot be upheld on the
78. 618 F.2d at 789 n.24.
79. There is simply no basis for converting the verb "affect" into the verb "obstruct." The dictionary defines "to affect" as "to produce an effect upon" or
"to produce a material influence upon or alteration in." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 19 (1977). It is fundamental that the plain and ordinary
meaning of statutory language controls. . . . Section 502(d) provides that
nothing in the 1949 Act shall produce an effect upon, influence, or alter any
stabilization program. The President's Order is in violation of that prohibition,
and it is therefore unlawful.
618 F.2d at 801 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
80. Pub. L. No. 93-387,88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975,1977,1979), reprinted in
12 U.S.C. 8 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979).
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basis of FPASA since the directive is inconsistent with provisions of that Act.

B. The East Texas Exception
Executive orders are only valid if consistent with the congressional statutes covering the same subject matter." The majority cited some cases that upheld Executive antidiscrimination
orders under FPASA, but failed to discuss United States v. East
Texas Motor Freight System, I ~ C an
. , important
~ ~
case that limits the authority of the Executive to issue antidiscrimination orders. The Fifth Circuit in East Texas looked to congressional
antidiscrimination statutes to determine whether an Executive
order could be used to invalidate a bona fide seniority system.
Noting the exemption for bona fide seniority systems in title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the court invalidated the use of the
Executive antidiscrimination order to disturb the system.8s
Thus, the application of an Executive order will be invalidated
to the extent that it conflicts with congressional intent.
To determine whether E.O. 12,092 is consistent with congressional intent concerning wage and price regulation, the legislative background of wage and price regulation must be carefully
analyzed. The inquiry will be broken into two parts: (1) the
Presidential authority to control wage and price regulation that
Congress has terminated or rejected, and (2) the authority Congress granted the President under COWPSA. If E.O. 12,092 is
found to be inconsistent with congressional intent, it should be
invalidated as was the antidiscrimination order in East Texas.
1. Congress has Terminated or Rejected Presidential Author-

ity for Economic Sanctions
Both the congressional termination of any statutes explicitly
granting Presidential authority to control wages and prices by
economic sanctions and the recent rejection of several attempts
to grant the President that power strongly suggest that economic sanctions run contrary to congressional intent. E.O.
12,092 instituted the economic sanctions that Congress either
terminated or rejected. As noted earlier, any explicit grant of authority to the President to control wages and prices by economic
81. See notes 37 & 64 supra.
82. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
83. Id. at 185.
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sanction has been terminated by Congress." The Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942,85the Stabilization Act of 1942," title
IV of the Defense Production Act of 1950,8' and the Economic
Stabilization Act of 197OS8have all been ended by Congress.
Congress tightly controlled the type of Presidential authority it
granted by express statute and imposed strict time limits for the
exercise of the power granted to the Executive. Congress' purpose in terminating the statutes was to remove Presidential
power to control wages and prices.
Furthermore, Congress clearly voiced its intent to deny Executive control when it rejected more than nineteen bills and
one amendment attempting to give the Executive power to regulate wages and prices through economic sanction^.^^ This legislative history indicates that Congress has been unwilling to allow
the President to impose further economic controls in any
manner.e0
The Current CO WPSA Provides Presidential Power to Issue "Purely Voluntary" Guidelines

2.

The current congressional statute concerning wage and
price regulation grants the President power to issue and monitor
purely voluntary wage and price guidelines, but in no way grants
power to impose economic sanctions. Congress passed COWPSA
in August of 1974 after having rejected a wide variety of bills
proposing different types of economic sanctions that could be
imposed by the President..' COWPSA established an advisory
body to monitor wage and price levels. The legislation clearly
banned any type of "mandatory control" that might be attempted under the Act.@=
Since Congress' most recent action in the area of wage and
price controls, COWPSA, was to grant the President power to
monitor the economy without imposing sanctions, the Presi84. See notes 38-51 and accompanying text supra.
85. Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (expired).
86. Ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765 (expired).
87. Ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798 (expired).
88. Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired).
89. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 494-95.
90. Brief for Appellee at 8-9, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
91. 1979 Hearings, supra note 37, at 494-95.
92. Pub. L. No. 93-387, 5 3(b), 88 Stat. 750 (1974) (amended 1975, 1977, 1979), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (Supp. I11 1979).
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dent's actions should be evaluated in the context of this Act?
COWPSA contains an affirmative congressional policy to leave
control of wages and prices to the free market," rather than to
invoke Presidential wage-price sanctions. The scope of authority
granted the President by COWPSA was defined by the bill's
sponsor, Senator Tower:
The proposed council, the Council on Wage and Price Stability, would have the power to monitor the economy, work
with labor and management to improve the structure of collective bargaining and encourage price restraint . . . .
I approach this legislation with some amount of apprehension for many may perceive the action which we take today to
be the first step back toward controls. If this view is pervasive,
it could further exacerbate our inflationary problem by stimulating anticipatory wage and price increases and hence further
the prospect of imposition of future controls. Congress must
demonstrate that this is not our intent. No economic authority is being granted or authorized. The Senate clearly demonstrated its opinion toward extending any form of economic
controls by defeating such a measure overwhelmingly on May
9, 1974,56-32. . . [The purpose of this bill is] merely to monitor the economy as a whole in cooperation with public and private agencies and not to reestablish an income policy. . . .s6

.

Senator Tower explained that COWPSA was not to be used
,top the free market from determining wage and price levels:
The provisions embodied in the Council on Wage and
Price Stability Act of 1974 represent a license by the Congress
to the President to exercise his influence to arrest the inflationary spiral. To this end I believe we should draw the line on
acceptable amendments to this legislation where the disci93. Legal Times of Washington, July 9, 1979, a t 15, col. 1. The majority found that
COWPSA did not invalidate E.O. 12,092. The majority felt the language of 3(b) of
COWPSA, providing that "[njothing in this Act . . . authorizes . . . mandatory economic controls," did not bar the President from imposing economic sanctions through a
different Executive agency, OFPP, than the Council established under COWPSA. The
majority concluded this was valid because E.O. 12,092 derived its authority from FPASA,
not COWPSA. 618 F.2d a t 795.
94. The sponsor of COWPSA defined what he felt would be an unacceptable encroachment upon the "free market" when he stated: "I believe we should draw the line
on acceptable amendments to this legislation where the discipline of an agency or a
council of the Federal Government begins to replace the discipline of the marketplace.
The discipline of the marketplace should be the final arbitrator of wages and prices." 120
CONG.REC.28,883 (1974) (remarks of Senator Tower).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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pline of an agency or a council of the Federal Government
begins to replace the discipline of the marketplace. The discipline of the marketplace should be the final arbitrator of
wages and prices. . . .
It has also been suggested that the President be given the
authority to demand information from all sectors of the economy through the issuance of subpenas. The President of the
United States has not asked for this authority, nor does he
want it. The power to subpena further infringes on the free
market system and hence should be r e j e ~ t e d . @ ~

COWPSA's legislative history points out that the ban on
"mandatory economic controls" extends to any executive economic sanctions that .would interfere with the operation of the
free market. The sponsors of COWPSA, who regarded even the
executive enforcement of subpoenas to be inconsistent with the
free market system, would have rejected any suggestion that the
Executive could impose procurement sanctions on federal government contractors.
In E.O. 12,092 the President employs COWPSA as the
mechanism for declaring wage and price standards and enforcing
compliance through the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.
This action goes far beyond the congressional intent in
COWPSA to grant the President authority to encourage purely
voluntary wage and price restraint." COWPSA's sponsor specifically stated that a federal agency or council should not displace
the free market.e8 E.O. 12,092 is invalid because it attaches
strong economic penalties to COWPSA guidelines and displaces
the free market as the arbitrator of wages and prices for federal
contractors.
The rule illustrated by United States v. East Texas Motor
Freight System, 'Inc.@@
is that the application of an Executive
order will be invalidated to the extent it conflicts with congressional intent.loOWhen Congress rejected more than nineteen
bills attempting to grant the President some authority to control
wages and prices, Congress demonstrated its intent to deny the
President any authority to use economic sanctions. Congress en96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Legal Times of Washington, July 9, 1979, at 15, col. 1-2; Brief for Appellee at 79, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
98. 120 CONG.REC.28,883 (1974) (remarks of Senator Tower).
99. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).
100. Id. at 185.
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acted COWPSA to provide only for Executive issuance and
monitoring of voluntary means of influencing wages and prices.
Since E.O. 12,092 implements economic sanctions and displaces
the free market by setting limits on Federal contractors' wages
and prices, it is governed by the East Texas exception.

C. Congress Has Not Ratified E.0. 12,092
The antidiscrimination orders that the majority relied upon
were ratified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 19641°1and
the later Equal Employment Opportunity Amendments,lo2but
Congress has not ratified E.O. 12,092. The majority opinion does
not adequately consider this important difference between the
antidiscrimination orders and the wage-price order.
In United States v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.,lo3the
Fifth Circuit explained:
At the least, there has been implied congressional approval of
the [Executive antidiscrimination order] programs; it can even
be argued that there has been express ratification. . . .

....

The second source of legislative authorization is Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . A reference in the Act, as
originally enacted, id. 2000(e)-8(d), to the Executive Order program indicated congressional intent that the program would
continue in existence.'"'
101. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 5 709(d), 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e
(1976)).
102. See Pub. L. No. 92-261,86 Stat. 103 (1972) (current version a t 42 U.S.C. 2000e
(1976)).
103. 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942 (1978).
104. Id. at 466-67. The court added that "[ojther aspects of the Act which were
enacted into law illustrate congressional contemplation of the program's [authorized by
antidiscrimination order] continuance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. $5 2000e-14, 2000e-17." Id. at
467. They went on to state that, "[tjhe regulation in controversy is an integral part of a
long-standing program [Executive antidiscrimination orders] which Congress has recognized and approved. We have no difEculty, therefore, in finding congressional authorization for the provision." Id.; see AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88, 96-98 (D.D.C.), vacated, AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
In Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971), the court also found the Executive antidiscrimination order involved
to be upheld by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court noted that the reference in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to Executive orders relating to fair employment practices for
government contractors indicated that Congress contemplated continuance of the Executive order programs. Indeed, as Congress has not prohibited presidential action in the
area of employment on federal or federally assisted contracts, the President is bound by
the express prohibitions of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 dealing with discrimination in employment. Id. at 171-74.
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In addition, the majority opinion in the instant case ignored the
subsequent ratification of the substantive content of the antidiscrimination orders in the 1972 amendments to title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, even though the lower court carefully considered the point.lo6
In contrast to the antidiscrimination orders, Congress has
not ratified E.O. 12,092. Simply because Congress extended
COWPSA after E.O. 12,092 was issued does not mean Congress
ratified E.O. 12,092's compliance sanctions.lo6The instant case
was pending in court when COWPSA was extended, and Congress expected the courts to resolve the legal questions surrounding E.O. 12,092.1°7The only statements made by Congress
concerning the validity of E.O. 12,092 explicitly denied any intention to influence the suit. For example, the House committee
which handled the extension noted that the committee "did not
seek to resolve [the controversy] on the issue of whether the Executive . . has exceeded the authority granted by C o n g r e s ~ . " ~ ~ ~

.

105. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 472 F. Supp. 88,96-98 (D.D.C.), vacated, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979). A series of amendments designed to curb the
Executive antidiscrimination order programs were defeated by Congress. See 118 CONG.
REC. 1664, 1676,4918 (1972). The House Report on the 1972 title VII amendments indicates congressional support for the Executive antidiscrimination program. See H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1971). See also United States v. New Orleans Public
Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 467 (5th Cir. 1977). vacated on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942
(1978) (court explains how the 1972 amendments support the antidiscrimination orders);
Legal Times of Washington, July 9, 1979 a t 13, col. 2-3.
106. The majority was persuaded that Congress' 1979 extension of COWPSA without significant modification, but with knowledge of the pending suit in the District
Court, was evidence that Congress did not intend COWPSA to bar the wage and price
procurement sanctions. The majority apparently found that the COWPSA extension indicated tacit approval of E.O. 12,092. Particularly important to the majority was the
increased funding and st& given to COWPSA. 618 F.2d a t 795-96.
The majority's conclusion might be questioned by the United States Supreme Court
decisions which have held that the failure of Congress to change a statute after an interpretation by the Executive branch is a poor guide to congressional intent. See e.g., Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d a t 815 n.* (D.C. Cir.) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
107. 618 F.2d at 809 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
108. H.R. REP. NO. 33, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979); 125 CONG.REC. H2322 (daily
ed. Apr. 25, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead). See also Brief for Amici Curiae, AFLCIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir. 1979). (three Senators and twenty-one Representatives of the House expressly deny the legality of E.O. 12,092 in this brief); Legal Times of
Washington, July 9,1979, a t 15, col. 2; 124 CONG.REC.S16781 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1978)
(a Sense of the Senate resolution passed before E.O. 12,092 expressing the view that
neither the 1949 FPASA nor any other statute allowed the President to impose a program of mandatory wage and price controls).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The majority in AFL-CIO v. Kahn misapplied the analogy
of the antidiscrimination orders by misinterpreting congressional intent in the area of wage and price regulation. Although
E.O. 12,092 might promote FPASA policies of economy and efficiency, three distinctions separate the wage-price situation from
the antidiscrimination cases relied upon by the majority. First,
E.O. 12,092 is inconsistent with section 502(d) of FPASA. Section 205(a) of FPASA prohibits the President from taking any
action "inconsistent" with other FPASA provisions. E.O. 12,092
is inconsistent with section 502(d)'s prohibition against affecting
a wage and price stabilization program because it alters the
purely voluntary nature of the current COWPSA guidelines.
Second, E.O. 12,092 should be governed by United States u.
East Texas Motor Freight System, Inc.,lO@
which held that applications of an Executive order that run contrary to congressional intent will be invalidated. A review of the wage and price
statutes Congress has terminated or rejected indicates Congress'
desire to avoid giving the President any power to impose economic sanctions. The legislative background of COWPSA clearly
shows that Congress intended the power granted the President
to be strictly limited to issuing voluntary guidelines that do not
impose economic sanctions. To the extent that E.O. 12,092 provides economic sanctions, it is contrary to congressional intent.
Third, E.O. 12,092 has not been ratified by Congress. The application of the antidiscrimination orders relied upon by the majority were ratified by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1972
amendments, but Congress has expressly denied any intention of
ratifying E.O. 12,092. For these three reasons E.O. 12,092 should
have been invalidated.
James W. Stewart

109. 564 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1977).

